Demands for answers about what happened to journalist Jamal Khashoggi are increasing, as the U.S. Administration puts pressure on Saudi Arabia to provide more information.
Turkish authorities say Khashoggi, a critic of the Saudi regime, was killed inside the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul a week ago. The Saudi government has denied any involvement in Khashoggi’s disappearance.
President Donald Trump has said that his Administration is pressing the Saudi government for more information about what happened, telling reporters, “We’re demanding everything.”
Meanwhile, a bi-partisan group of Senators sent a letter to the President on Wednesday asking for an investigation into whether or not sanctions should be imposed on Saudi Arabia, if in fact, the reports of Khashoggi’s murder are verified.
Cipher Brief Expert Gary Grappo is a former U.S. ambassador and former Charge’ d’Affaires and Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Riyadh. We asked him to comment on Khashoggi’s disappearance, and as part of a broader piece on Riyadh, we also asked his thoughts on recent Saudi moves to jail and marginalize clerics, as well as what he sees within the next 12 months on the likely outcome of the Qatar crisis.
Grappo: The mysterious disappearance of Jamal Khashoggi casts further doubt on the current Saudi leadership’s judgment, particularly if allegations of its culpability prove true. Taken in conjunction with the arrest of the Lebanese prime minister, provocation of a conflict with Qatar, perpetuation of a horrendous war in Yemen, et al, the kingdom’s behavior now presents new challenges for a Trump Administration heretofore all too forgiving of this leadership. As it stands, the Saudis are marching headlong into uncharted and dangerous territory for themselves and Washington.
The Cipher Brief: Given the Saudi regime’s recent moves to jail and marginalize clerics, to what extent will Mohammed bin Salman (or others) be able to reduce the influence of the traditionally powerful clerical pillar in Saudi society and politics? Were this to occur, to what extent would Saudi society accept such an increased role for the monarchy and decreased role for the clergy?
Grappo: While Saudis, not to mention many in the West, may disapprove of MbS’s methods, few within the Kingdom will lament the decline of the influence of the Kingdom’s clerical class. For far too long, Saudi citizens, most especially younger Saudis, have felt that clerics have held much too strong a grip on their lives. While still comparatively devout Muslims, Saudis want to see their nation join the ranks of the international community in economics, culture, technology and education. The clerics, in their minds, have held them back. So, taking them down a few notches is more likely to be seen by under-40 Saudis as welcome and worthy of their support. The danger, however, is in MbS’s methods, some of which have also been applied to Saudis allegedly involved in corruption or in opposition politics. Going after perceived political opponents as MbS has done recently risks alienating the very class of Saudis that MbS wishes to court with his economic and social reforms, including actions against clerics. A policy that’s seen as a nationwide “purge” of those appearing to threaten MbS’s personal authority, as opposed to that of the Kingdom or the House of Saud, can only reinforce doubts about the new direction of Saudi Arabia under MbS and potentially even suggest that the authority of the clerics has been traded for the outsized will of Mohammed bin Salman.
The Cipher Brief: Within the next 12 months, what is your estimation of the likely outcome and/or progression of the Qatar-Gulf crisis and what will Saudi Arabia’s role in that crisis be?
Grappo: Saudi Arabia will continue to lead the opposition among several GCC states – the UAE and Bahrain as well as Egypt – to Qatar, further fracturing what had been the Arab world’s most effective and cohesive alliance. As has already been happening, it will drive Doha closer to Tehran, while still maintaining a necessary security relationship with Washington. And it will no doubt draw Muscat and Kuwait closer into Tehran’s orbit as well. Washington’s apparently ineffective action (or inaction) in the crisis is not only mystifying but also unwise. As in the Yemeni civil war, the Hariri kidnapping and recent Ottawa-Riyadh flair-up, the Saudis in general and MbS in particular have been acting “without a net,” i.e., without America’s counsel. And they’re making strategically bad mistakes. Handing the Saudis a regional security/foreign policy blank check serves neither the Kingdom’s interests nor those of the US. Tragically, these crises may speak to this administration’s inexperience with and attendant low estimation of the value of diplomacy and the Kingdom’s concomitant turn away from diplomacy and the strong consultative relationship that have characterized previous Saudi monarchs’ policies. A quiet, concerted, firm and clear diplomatic initiative on the part of the US could still salvage this valuable Gulf alliance. But time is getting short. The parties are moving further apart, creating unstable divisions within the region and opportunities for exploitation by Tehran.