Weakening Ties That Bind
Two founding principles have netted together the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) since its founding in 1981: their collective security and the protection and reliability of oil exports. These interests also served as the linchpin of the GCC states – Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates – with their most important partner: the United States.
It is no coincidence that the GCC was formed just a year and half after the Islamic revolution in Iran, which installed a radical and ultimately hostile Shi’ite government that called for the overthrow of all monarchies in the Muslim world. They needed a united front before their threatening Persian neighbor and reliable protection. Forming the Council achieved the first but the second could only be secured with a long-term relationship with one of the then two reigning superpowers in the world, the U.S. or the Soviet Union. The latter was unthinkable for a variety of reasons, the most relevant of which was America’s growing demand for oil in the face of declining domestic supplies. The Gulf, principally Saudi Arabia, would be a major source. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, was able to rely on its substantial domestic sources of oil.
But times have changed. Starting with 9/11, the U.S. government as well as the American media and public began to question the value of U.S. relations with and energy dependence on Middle Eastern states. Justifying those ties became more difficult for U.S. administrations as U.S. forces and security and intelligence organizations confronted Islamist extremists from Morocco to Pakistan, most especially in Iraq and Afghanistan. Not even the so-called moderate states of the Gulf were spared scrutiny.
Meanwhile, economics and technology conspired against oil exporters to the U.S., most especially Saudi Arabia. First came the 2008-2009 recession in the U.S. and subsequent lower demand for oil. Also in 2008, after nearly three decades of declining domestic oil production and more than a decade of improving technology and techniques, U.S. companies dramatically stepped up oil and gas production using highly effective hydraulic fracturing, or fracking, and horizontal drilling in “tight oil” fields in Texas, North Dakota, and elsewhere. As a result, since 2008, GCC oil exports to the U.S. have declined by more than 25 percent. (1)
The oil export picture is not likely to improve for the GCC. The U.S. Energy Information Administration now forecasts that U.S. domestic oil production, which had fallen to less than 8.5 million barrels per day in 2008, will reach nearly 14.0 MMB/D by 2015 and 16.0 by 2020. (2) As more effective renewable energy and energy-conservation technologies enter the U.S. market, America’s need for foreign oil may effectively diminish to zero in as few as two decades.
The question for the Gulf States is will the U.S. still feel the same strategic need to protect the Gulf and secure the sea lanes through which more than 40 percent of the world’s oil must travel? How will American taxpayers and the U.S. Congress feel about protecting someone else’s oil? And, can the GCC remain united in the face of waning American backing?
Shifting Political Sands
Recent geopolitical developments in the Middle East have complicated these questions.
- A Sunni-led government, albeit thoroughly detestable, was replaced by a Shi’ite government in Iraq, the first Shi’ite-dominant Arab government in the Middle East. Following the withdrawal of U.S. forces, extremism, and factionalism are now on the rise in Iraq, especially in western-most Anbar Province.
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In Syria, a three-year conflict has deteriorated from a popular revolt against a dictator to a sectarian/ethnic civil war producing more than 150,000 deaths and over four million refugees and displaced persons, rivaling figures in Iraq at its worst stage. Meanwhile, as national elections approach in June 2014, Bashar al-Assad’s continued rule no longer seems in question, despite Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states’ support for various opposition forces. Saudi Arabia blames the U.S. for diffident support for the effort to topple the Alawite regime in Damascus and break the Iran-Syria-Hezbollah axis.
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In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, an especially emotive issue for Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah, the Hamas-Fatah feud is on a far-from-certain path toward reconciliation (for the fourth time) but U.S.-brokered talks between Israeli and Palestinian negotiators have been suspended and Israeli settlement activity continues.
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The GCC’s strongest and most important ally, the U.S., and its largest and most powerful member, Saudi Arabia, are engaged in an unprecedented row over Iran’s nuclear program. Even if the U.S. and its P5+1 partners manage to achieve an agreement with the Islamic Republic, it is doubtful Saudi fears about Iran will be assuaged by what it will undoubtedly view to be a temporary and inadequate rollback of the Islamic state’s nuclear program. Judging from recent comments from Prince Turki al-Faisal, a former intelligence chief and Saudi ambassador to the US, a Saudi nuclear program might result. (3)
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In the rest of the region, turmoil, and uncertainty hang heavy as old regimes are toppled and Islamists and traditionalists vie for control. The most significant change has occurred in Egypt, whose military-led overthrow of a democratically elected Islamist president has led to division within the GCC. Saudi Arabia is supporting the military while now outlawed opponents within the Muslim Brotherhood are backed by Qatar. The U.S. has shown tepid support for what had been one of its strongest allies in the Middle East, causing increased tension with Riyadh.
The confluence of so many conflicting forces begs a reassessment of the GCC and its future as well as its relations with its strategic ally, the U.S.
Core Interests
The Gulf and especially the broader Middle East are and will remain a region fraught with instability. Even under the most optimistic scenarios for some of the region’s current tensions and problems – Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Syrian civil war, perceived Iranian regional hegemony, and continuing struggles with extremism – the region is likely to face years of crisis, instability, and uncertainty. Sadly, as in Syria, there will also be continued violence.
The region also faces profound systemic problems: backward education systems; sluggish economic growth amidst continued meager investment; increasing population growth and a youth bulge in the face of declining essential resources like water and food; rising unemployment, and stunted political development. President Obama has spoken of a U.S. “pivot” to the Far East and to the increasing forces at play in that part of the world. But the Middle East will remain front and center on the foreign policy radar screens of future presidents for generations.
The region’s daunting challenges are simply beyond the capabilities of the governments of the region, even without the aforementioned systemic problems. Nevertheless, as governments try to cope, they will face unforeseen external as well as internal security challenges. They will need to work together, and will need the support of the only government able to provide them with the kind of security assurances they must have: the U.S.
So, one of the original founding principles, security, remains as much in play as ever, and more than sufficient justification for keeping the GCC as an institution together and its relationship with the U.S. strong. All its members will continue to need to cooperate in combating terrorism and will rely on American expertise and intelligence to help them. A united front in the face of Iranian ambitions will also be essential.
Moreover, ensuring GCC views and policies are aligned with those of the U.S., especially if the P5+1 manages to reach a deal with Iran, will be vital. The military ties created over nearly 40 years, which were instrumental in building increasingly professional military forces in each of the GCC states, will remain important and are irreplaceable.
However, the side of the equation that has changed and will likely never again be what it once was is oil. Most of the GCC states will continue to rely heavily on oil and gas exports, but less on the U.S. market. While the U.S. will become less reliant on Middle East oil and gas, its key trading partners in Europe and Asia will become more dependent. Therefore, securing the flow of those energy sources remains a vital strategic economic interest to the U.S., justifying continued U.S. vigilance of the Gulf shipping lanes. In addition, U.S. oil and gas companies and engineering businesses willvremain active in the region’s economic activity.
With American dependence on Middle East oil diminishing, Washington’s strategic interest in the region must, therefore, be couched differently than in the past, e.g., regional stability and global energy market reliability. Furthermore, that reevaluation must take up the matter of shared responsibility.
Despite Washington’s continued strategic interest in the region and its stability, other nations must also acknowledge their responsibility and step up their efforts to meet the challenges at hand. The U.S. will and should retain the lead in preserving the region’s security, but ways must be considered to mitigate the cost to the American taxpayer and U.S. forces.
Gulf member states should consider adding a security surcharge to their oil and gas exports, the proceeds of which could be used to offset the costs to the U.S. government and others who participate in security-related operations. Nations like China, Japan, South Korea as well as NATO members should be asked to contribute more resources to anti-pirating, minesweeping, and maritime anti-terrorism operations in and around the Gulf. Some already have and their increased commitment needs to be institutionalized. The U.S. should remain active and continue to play a coordinating function. Such actions would significantly address concerns of the U.S. Congress and American taxpayers over U.S. forces and funds being used to “protect someone else’s oil.”
GCC Self-Help
The leadership of the GCC must also engage in some self-examination. First, they should take up the Sunni-Shi’ite conflict that now plagues the region. With their resources and Saudi Arabia’s position as Custodian of Islam’s holiest places, the GCC states can and must play leadership roles in defusing tensions, ending violence between Muslims, and promoting tolerance.
Second, regardless of whether the P5+1 manages to strike a deal with Iran, the states of the GCC can significantly reduce tensions in the Gulf, secure the safe passage of theirs and Iran’s oil exports, and help address Sunni-Shi’ite tensions by improving relations with Tehran. Even if they are able to achieve only short-term progress, deferring long-term differences to a future date, they can begin to create a more stable region. That will necessarily entail risks for the GCC. But with U.S. and other nations’ security support, the GCC leaders can better decide how far they can realistically go.
Third, all Gulf States must pledge not to seek nuclear weapons. Such acquisition would effectively destroy the Non-Proliferation Treaty in the Middle East and exponentially increase regional tensions. Other nations outside the GCC, possibly Turkey or Egypt, might also be tempted to seek such weapons. Worst of all, it would further undermine the relationship with the U.S.
Fourth, while democracy may yet be a distant dream for the Gulf States, their governments can nevertheless begin to extend greater freedom to their populations, especially women, religious minorities, the media, non-government organizations, and private business. Modestly devolving such liberties will help stem some of the inevitable social and economic stresses that are to come.
The GCC must accept that the circumstances that drove its formation almost 35 years ago have changed. It must also change. However, those changes, wisely and prudently undertaken, can ensure the future stability and security of the region for the ensuing decades.
(1) http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/
(2) Ibid.
(3) “Saudi prince says Gulf states must balance threat from Iran.” Reuters, 23 Apr. 2014. Web. 2 June 2014.
www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/23/us-saudi-security-idUSBREA3M1BJ20140423