As many predicted as the U.S. was exiting Iraq in 2011, the country and its fragile democracy are now in very serious trouble. After the investment of 4,500-plus American lives lost and more than one trillion dollars spent there from 2003 through 2011 and a much welcomed exit at the end of 2011, this is difficult for most Americans to accept. But with parliamentary elections set to take place in April, the reality is that there are real U.S. and Iraqi interests at stake that make coming to Baghdad’s aid imperative now.
Anbar province, the western-most, Sunni-majority province in Iraq, is under virtual siege by Muslim extremist groups, including the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), a group that is ideologically linked to al-Qaeda, if no longer organizationally. Allowing such groups to succeed would not only pose a grave threat to Iraq’s nascent democracy, it would also fuel extremism in Iraq and the region.
Anbar was the site of horrific battles between U.S. troops and extremists back in 2004 and thereafter until the founding of the Sunni Awakening, or Sahwa, movement in Anbar in 2006 and its alliance with U.S. forces in 2007. Ramadi and Fallujah, names that became very familiar to Americans in 2004, are the two key battleground cities in the province. Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has dispatched thousands of Iraqi troops to repel the extremists and has vigorously sought U.S. aid. Results so far have been mixed.
The U.S. cannot be indifferent to Baghdad’s plight. One reason is that, simply stated, Iraq cannot afford to lose Anbar and the U.S. cannot afford Baghdad losing that province and its estimated 1.5 million citizens. It would have serious consequences for Iraq’s national unity and its political system, further widening the sectarian fissures that already divide the nation and lessen prospects of its repair. It would also condemn Iraqis living in Anbar to utter despair and probably cause a mass exodus from the province of hundreds of thousands in order to escape living under Islamic extremists. That would exacerbate political and sectarian pressures in the country that Maliki and his already hard-pressed government do not need.
Second, Iraq’s national parliamentary elections are scheduled for the end of April of this year. A conflict in Anbar will render such elections in this all-important province highly problematic, if not altogether impossible. If Iraqis are to experience a peaceful and fair election in which all candidates and voters can fully participate, Anbar must be stabilized and the Iraqi government’s control re-established. Anything less would hold the election hostage to fear and intimidation and cast grave doubts on that nation’s still nascent electoral process. Inability to carry out the election would possibly place Iraq in an even worse political predicament than the post-election period of 2010 when the winning candidates were unable to form a government for almost nine months and parliamentary operations were suspended for a nearly equal period.
Third, an Al-Qaeda-friendly Anbar would exponentially ratchet up the violence in neighboring provinces, e.g., Nineveh and Salah Eddin, and in Syria on Iraq’s western border. A base in Anbar would serve as an attractive gathering point for the region’s extremists to continue the withering attacks on Syria and even harass otherwise friendly neighboring states such as Jordan. On the other hand, closing Anbar to the extremists would deal a significant strategic blow to the extremist movements in Syria and make a significant dent in the numbers of Iraqi militants, both Sunni and Shia, traveling from Iraq to participate in the Syria conflict.
Fourth, U.S. assistance would significantly strengthen a U.S.-Iraq partnership that has deteriorated since the U.S. troop withdrawal at the end of 2011. As a result of that diminished relationship, Iran has replaced the U.S. as Iraq’s most influential interlocutor, creating additional challenges for the U.S. in the region. These include increased security threats to Israel (as a result of easier Iranian access to Hezbollah in Lebanon) and Baghdad’s support for Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad. U.S. assistance in this time of crisis would demonstrate to Maliki and even more importantly to Iraqis that the U.S. is its best partner and that stronger ties to the U.S. and the West offer Iraq its best future. Military aid at this time would give the U.S. the leverage it currently lacks to do this. Moreover, it would send a clear signal to Tehran that the U.S. is not about to abandon the region, either to extremist Sunnis or to Iran.
Finally, aiding Baghdad would reassure a very skeptical region of America’s continuing engagement in the Middle East and commitment to its stability. Correctly or not, that confidence has been badly shaken in recent years by the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, a perceived diffident approach to the Syrian conflict, controversial outreach to Iran, and tension with such regional stalwart allies such as Israel and Saudi Arabia.
The type of aid would need to be scrutinized by Congress, but should include more and higher quality weapons, including expedited delivery of Apache attack helicopters and more of the already provided Hellfire air-to-ground missiles, and the training necessary to use them effectively. The U.S. should also consider providing: critical intelligence information and support through the end of the conflict; urgently dispatched U.S. Special Forces to aid in training Iraqi forces and especially local Sunni tribal forces fighting to oust the extremists and in planning operations against the extremists; and air support to Iraqi forces, including aerial surveillance, transport, and even close air support. Using local Sunni tribal forces as opposed to Shia-dominated regular forces only would foil one of the extremists’ objectives of posing this as a Sunni vs. Shia conflict. However, since this is Baghdad’s fight, the U.S. should not dispatch land combat forces. Iraq must now fight its own battles, but its friends should be willing to extend a strong helping hand.
This is a two-front ideological confrontation that Baghdad can and must win. First, it can turn around the poor relationship Maliki’s Shia-majority government currently has with the nation’s Sunnis, especially the large numbers resident in Anbar. By making our support contingent on Maliki working closely with and through the Anbar tribes, Maliki can make good on earlier unfulfilled pledges to integrate Sunnis into the Iraqi security services, extend to them the same benefits as other members of the security services, and offer more local autonomy to the tribes and end their marginalization from Iraqi political life. The Anbar tribes still have positive views of the U.S. and our support for them after 2004. Returning our support to them through the Iraqi government while insisting on a united and inclusive Iraq would go a long way toward helping to mend Baghdad’s relations with Anbar’s Sunni population.
Second, winning the ideological battle would eliminate an extremist alternative that the vast majority of Iraqis, both Sunni and Shia, and the region reject.
The U.S. must ensure that Baghdad wins this fight and is allowed to continue to build the democracy in which the U.S. and so many Americans invested so much. We can do it with the right kind of military and political support now.