The U.S. Administration has now indicated it will provide military support to the Syrian opposition. How much military aid and to what purpose are questions we must ask as the broader region’s stability and our vital interests are at stake. In a region in which religious and ethnic tensions have never been far from the surface, we may be facing a religious war for which neither the U.S. nor the region is prepared.
Syria lacks a unifying internal figure or organization to unite legitimate Syrian opposition groups. No outside power has sought to bring unity to the opposition, which resultantly has splintered along predictable sectarian Sunni vs. Shiite/Alawite lines. Those divisions have invited all manner of outside intervention, some well-intended but debatably helpful — e.g., Saudi Arabia and Qatar — and others downright troubling — i.e., al-Qaeda and similar Sunni terrorists, Hezbollah, Iran and militant Iraqi Sunni and Shiite groups.
The latest developments in the Syrian war have led to doubts about the eventual departure of President Bashar al-Assad. Furthermore, vying sectarian factions with the active support of aforementioned interlopers have turned their weapons against one another, creating a new, regionally portentous second act to the tragedy of the Syrian civil war. Equally disturbing, they indicate that Iran is gaining the upper hand in Syria and is more in control of events there and the eventual outcome. All of this militates against America’s interests in the region.
But it’s the looming third act that must have our attention. Throughout the conflict, Iran has taken a clear-eyed view: defeat of the Alawite-led government in Syria, regardless of successor regime, would sever the vital communication and supply link with its Lebanese Shiite client. Losing Syria, the Middle East’s geographic fulcrum, would isolate and severely weaken Hezbollah and deprive Iran of its most important strategic asset in confronting Israel. Iran’s suspected aim to become the regional hegemon would similarly suffer. The theocratic state may conclude that with the crippling of its asset in Lebanon, it really has no alternative left for confronting Israel and the U.S. than expedited development of nuclear weapons.
It now appears that Iran and Hezbollah are seeking to redefine the conflict as a religious one. Syrian government forces, openly backed by Hezbollah fighters, have turned back opposition gains in places like Qusayr and allowed Syrian forces to regain the initiative. Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah has publicly sought to rally Lebanese Shiites behind Assad and against Sunnis. The noted and outspoken Qatar-based Sunni cleric, Yusuf Qaradawi, poured rhetorical fuel on the flames of religious tensions late last month, calling on all Sunni Muslims to join Sunni rebels fighting Assad’s regime.
Thus, the war in Syria may be increasingly seen by the region’s Muslims as something very different than what the West perceives. In a view now advanced by Nasrallah, Qaradawi and some Iraqi clerics, it is a religious war. As the war intensifies, we should expect a call to arms by other clerics in the region, Shiite and Sunni alike, as a “religious duty.” It could become a regional religious war similar to that witnessed in Iraq 2006-2008, but far wider and without the moderating influence of American forces.
Such a religious conflict would spread from Syria and potentially infect Iraq and Bahrain with Shiite majorities and Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Pakistan with significant Shiite minorities. Other Muslim nations with large Sunni majorities, including those outside the region such as Turkey, would inevitably be sucked into the tempest of religious fervor. Majority Shiite Iran, however, would probably be immune initially to the sort of discord it appears to be abetting in Syria. It would quickly learn, however, that once the contagion of religious hatred is unleashed, it could not remain immune.
One need look back no further than Northern Ireland to understand the seductive, but uniquely lethal appeal of a religious war. Political accommodation is rarely an option. Military victory, if ever possible, comes at huge expense to both sides. And, the conflict’s underlying tensions and reasons are left unresolved. Given what we know about Sunni-Shiite antagonism dating back to the seventh century, there is little to believe that a Muslim religious war would be different. In all likelihood, given the known emotions, stakes and geopolitical implications, it could become the “mother of religious wars.”
The script to “Syria: Act III” appears evident: greater bloodshed, political uncertainty and even chaos in and outside Syria, proliferation of terrorist groups with virtual free reign to threaten or undermine adjoining states, and economic collapse. The humanitarian cost and threat to regional security and to the region’s oil sources are inestimable. And non-Muslim, secular nations like the United States would find themselves ill-prepared and ill-equipped politically to contain such a religious conflict.
For an administration avowedly disinclined to engage in one more Middle East conflict, hesitation to intervene in the Syrian crisis is understandable. Uncertainty over our leverage with opposition groups, unclear motivations of many of them, the potential for the violence to escalate – as it ultimately has – and inability to sway Russia and China to the right side of history, have all prevented active intervention.
But, the absence of our leadership there has contributed to worsening violence and instability. It is time for America to assume leadership to proactively seek to contain and eventually resolve this conflict in a way that serves Syrian interests, maintains regional stability, protects Israel and creates a positive climate for settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, thwarts Iran’s destructive ambitions, and by all means averts the catastrophe of a regional religious war.
First, we need to reexamine the usefulness of establishing no-fly zones in the north and south of the country. It would relieve the pressure from Turkey and Jordan, allow access of humanitarian organizations to Syrians, and offer much-needed safe havens for vetted opposition groups.
Second, the State Department and the CIA, with the support of other countries sympathetic to the democratic opposition, should conduct – if they haven’t already – a thorough vetting of opposition groups with the intention of eventually arming them, organizing them to establish a government-in-exile, and helping them draft an interim plan for governance following Assad’s departure. Such a plan would reassure all the religious and ethnic factions that their rights and security will be protected in the new Syria. The arms provided to the vetted groups must be sufficient to signal to Assad and his Iranian and Hezbollah backers that victory on their terms is not possible.
Third, the U.S. and other nations as well as the UN and the Organization of the Islamic Conference should mount a concerted effort to reach out to Muslim nations around the world and urge them to tamp down anti-Sunni and anti-Shiite passions. This is especially necessary in Iraq and Lebanon.
No country is better equipped to lead this effort than the U.S. Others, including many of our allies in Europe and the Gulf, would rally to our cause, providing added funding, weapons, and political and humanitarian support needed to avert further deterioration. But absent this critical ingredient of American leadership, we should expect more bad news from a worsening Syria and greater anxiety and instability in the surrounding region.