That has tragically been proven the case in Syria. As the New York Times reported November 8 in a sobering piece by Anne Barnard, Syrians are increasingly reconciling themselves to Bashar al-Assad. That includes former and current members of armed opposition groups, many of whom have given up on the democratic opposition and the Free Syrian Army (FSA). That is because neither the FSA nor their external supporters ever really had an effective and convincing plan for removing the tenacious dictator and replacing him with a functioning alternative.
Assad and his coven of supporters – Iran, Russia, Hezbollah and Iraqi Shia militias – on the other hand are committed to a strategy: employ all means, including the use of chemical weapons against non-combatants, to halt and eventually defeat those opposition elements most likely to receive U.S. and Gulf Arab support. The lack of an effective counter-plan and an inability to form a united opposition organization has meant ceding the battlefield and the political arena to Assad or to extremist groups.
Chest-thumping proclamations of “Assad must go!” and assertions of “red lines” were mere hollow threats unsupported by a realistic strategy. Dictators are not moved by words and very rarely by threats. Assad, Russia and Iran called the U.S. and its supporters on their vacuous words and indecision, while Syria’s democratic opposition and the FSA mistakenly believed them.
Nearly three years into their civil war, Syrians have no stomach now for seeing their country descend into a Lebanon circa 1983 or Iraq in 2007, i.e., a killing field for violent extremists hell-bent on tearing down a country and building some illusory Islamist state in which Syrians have no political or personal freedom. Better the devil Assad that they know.
So, if Syrians are prepared to cast their lot with the dictator of Damascus, what should governments previously opposed to the regime do now? They are not without options. Assad wants and needs legitimacy; first from the Syrians, but also from the international community. These governments can play an important role in ensuring that legitimacy comes only under certain conditions:
First, Assad must agree to internationally assisted and monitored free and fair elections for both the presidency and the national assembly within a specified timeframe, e.g., two to three years. More time would allow Syria a transition period to prepare adequately and avoid the mistakes of Egypt and Libya.
Second, during the transition period, political parties would be free to organize and campaign. No party espousing violence or disenfranchisement of any ethnic, tribal or religious group would be eligible to participate in the country’s political space. The media and public interest groups would abide by comparable rules and enjoy similar freedom.
Third, Assad may not run for president for a pre-agreed period of time, if ever. Ten years ought to be the minimum. (Retirement would be best.)
Fourth, at some point before elections for the national assembly and presidency, Syrians would vote for representatives to a constitutional assembly that would draft a new constitution to be presented to and approved by Syrians in a UN-supervised national referendum.
Fifth, an internationally approved group of Syrian jurists would hear and judge cases of criminal behavior by members of the current Assad government as well as opposition groups. No Syrian convicted of violent crimes would be eligible to serve in any capacity in a future Syrian government.
Sixth, the Syrian army and police should be preserved but with new leadership. The current “mukhabarat,” or military and internal security, would be disbanded. Currently serving military officers accused of serious crimes would have to be removed and await the judgment of Syrian jurists as to the nature of their alleged crimes. The new army leadership would be vetted by the international community. The army and police would turn their full attention to restoring order, protecting the public, and quelling violence between rival opposition groups. The latter would be required to lay down their arms before entering the legitimate political process. Non-Syrian groups and individuals fighting in the country would depart immediately or be forcibly expelled by government forces.
Seventh, a Syria-based UN monitoring group would observe and report to the Security Council on Syrian government compliance with all of these conditions. This would include adherence to human rights, follow up on arresting and trying alleged violators, and the army’s actions to rid the country of external fighters and restore order.
Finally, as actions are taken, the international community should consider lifting sanctions. Furthermore, securing Assad’s pledge to abide by these and other necessary conditions should be enshrined in a UNSC resolution, which would confer the legitimacy that Assad wants, but can only get with strict conditions. Failure would mean pursuing Assad via the International Court of Justice in The Hague.
Accepting Assad is distasteful to many in the international community. But for the Syrian people, the luxury of a fading alternative with its attendant and horrifying violence, hunger, uncertainty, dislocation and endless suffering is something that they can no longer afford. The nation of Syria must be preserved.
The U.S. and others in the international community must step up now and bring an end to the Syrian civil war. Now, unlike previously, they must back up words with concerted and vigorous action. They can do that. They can end the misery of the Syrian people. And they can still meet Syrians’ aspirations for peace, stability, freedom, democracy and national unity.
So, where is the plan?